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INTRODUCTION
In their seminal article, Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury (2011) 
introduce the idea of institutional infrastruc-
ture while discussing institutional complex-
ity. They drew attention to institutional 
infrastructure as the features that bind a field 
together and govern field interactions. They 
also suggested that the lack of a developed 
conceptual framework for comparing fields 
could be dealt with, at least partially, by an 
analysis of institutional infrastructure. One 
of our aims in this chapter is to draw together 
these two ideas of institutional infrastructure 
and field comparison to review whether and 
how the former differs across fields.
We argue that a field’s institutional infra-
structure can be usefully delineated for the 
purpose of better understanding different 
states or conditions of fields and how they 
affect processes of field maintenance and 
change. However, there is relatively little 
work on institutional infrastructure. As such, 
we will first explore the definitions of organi-
zational fields, as the bounded area within 
which infrastructure exists as a way of elabo-
rating that concept beyond the descriptors 
used by Greenwood et al. (2011). Following 
on from that we explore the use of the con-
cept institutional infrastructure across several 
scholarly fields, and develop our definition 
and elaborate the field elements involved. 
We argue that clarifying differences in field 
infrastructure would allow us to develop a 
better understanding of organizational field 
dynamics, enabling field comparisons and 
improved theorizing.
The idea of institutional infrastructure is 
related to that of governance of organiza-
tional fields. In developing our arguments, 
we consider governance as the formal mech-
anisms that maintain the ‘rules of the game’ 
within a field. Institutional infrastructure thus 
includes field governance arrangements, but 
also other cultural, structural and relational 
elements that generate the normative, cogni-
tive and regulative forces that reinforce field 
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governance, and render field logics material 
and field governance performable. However, 
as with institutional infrastructure, there is 
very little written on the governance of organ-
izational fields per se. As Kraatz and Block 
(2008) point out, there has been work on the 
role of the state, professions and field-level 
actors in general, that examine influence and 
control. But this has not been developed as 
governance, yet we know that questions of 
control are central to understanding fields. So 
we explore how the concept has been used, 
develop a definition and examine the rela-
tionship between institutional infrastructure 
and governance.
To examine these relationships more 
closely, we analyze three different fields 
(professional services, forestry and impact 
investing) describing their institutional infra-
structure, its degree of elaboration and asso-
ciated governance mechanisms. From the 
comparison of the infrastructure of those 
fields, we then describe different configura-
tions and states of institutional infrastructure 
and discuss their implications for the mainte-
nance and change of organizational fields and 
their associated governance. We close with a 
number of provocations for further study of 
institutional infrastructure, field governance 
and field-level institutional dynamics.
ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS
The concept of an organizational field is one 
of the cornerstones of institutional theory 
(Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Scott, 2014), an 
‘increasingly useful level of analysis’ (Reay 
& Hinings, 2005: 351), and the concept that 
is ‘vitally connected to the agenda of under-
standing institutional processes and organi-
zations’ (Scott, 2014: 219; Wooten and 
Hoffman, 2017; Hardy and Maguire, 2017; 
Kraatz and Block, 2017). Yet, definitions of 
organizational fields vary in their scope and 
emphasis, and we have no clear classi-
fication of different types or conditions of 
fields (Greenwood et  al., 2011; Zietsma, 
Groenewegen, Logue, & Hinings, 2017). 
Various studies have described fields as 
being in different states or conditions, such 
as emerging (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 
2004), mature (Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006), fragmented (Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 
1987), or turbulent (Farjoun, 2002).
The terms ‘organizational fields’ (Wooten 
& Hoffman, 2008) and ‘organizational fields’ 
(Scott, 2014) are often used interchange-
ably (Meyer, 2008), and other related terms 
include ‘strategic action fields’ (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012) and simply fields (Bourdieu, 
1986). Most scholars in the institutional 
theory of organizations use DiMaggio and 
Powell’s definition, which states that fields 
comprise ‘a recognized area of institutional 
life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies and other 
organizations that produce similar services 
or products’ (1983: 148). This definition 
appears to privilege relationships among 
actors, or networks, and yet the structuration 
arguments on which it is based also empha-
size shared understandings of power, knowl-
edge, identities and boundaries among actors, 
as fields are formed by
an increase in the extent of interaction among 
organizations in the field; the emergence of 
sharply defined inter-organizational structures of 
domination and patterns of coalition; an increase 
in the information load with which organizations 
in a field must contend; and the development of a 
mutual awareness among participants in a set of 
organizations that they are involved in a common 
enterprise. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148)
Scott’s definition of organizational fields, ‘a 
collection of diverse, interdependent organi-
zations that participate in a common meaning 
system’ (Scott, 2014: 106), emphasizes these 
shared understandings, as do definitions like 
Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006: 28), defin-
ing the organizational field as ‘clusters of 
organizations and occupations whose bound-
aries, identities and interactions are defined 
and stabilized by shared institutional logics’.
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Yet other definitions of fields emphasize 
conflict, rather than sharedness. Bourdieu, 
for example, viewed the field as ‘networks of 
social relations, structured systems of social 
positions within which struggles or maneu-
vers take place over resources, stakes and 
access’ (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998: 
260). While this definition doesn’t necessar-
ily indicate differences in meaning systems 
(simply competition over the pie), Hoffman 
(1999: 351) laid the foundation for differ-
ences in meaning systems by arguing that an 
organizational field
forms around a central issue – such as the protec-
tion of the natural environment – rather than a 
central technology or market … fields become 
centers of debates in which competing interests 
negotiate over issue interpretation. As a result, 
competing institutions may lie within individual 
populations (or classes of constituencies) that 
inhabit a field.
Recent work extends this view that fields 
may be contested by focusing upon multiple, 
often competing, institutional logics (Reay & 
Hinings, 2005, 2009; Greenwood et  al., 
2011). A major thrust of this body of work 
has been on the movement from one logic to 
another within a field or, more recently, man-
aging the existence of multiple logics in a 
field (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott, 2014). 
Indeed, the emphasis in discussing fields 
over the past decade has been primarily 
focused on the element of meaning, under 
the rubric of institutional logics (Thornton, 
Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), though the idea 
of a plurality of actors being related to a plu-
rality of logics brings networks and logics 
together to some extent (Hoffman, 1999; 
Lounsbury, 2002; Dunn & Jones, 2010; 
Voronov, DeClerq, & Hinings, 2013).
It is because of the emphasis on institu-
tional logics in organizational fields that 
Greenwood et al. (2011) introduced the idea 
of institutional infrastructure. It is a recog-
nition that fields are more than logics and 
directs attentions to the structural elements 
underpinning field activity. For example, 
the positions of actors, their networks and 
relations, how they are governed, are key 
components of organizational fields. Power 
relations and subject positions, defined as 
‘the socially “constructed” and legitimated 
identities available in a field’ (Maguire et al., 
2004: 658), are central to both Bourdieu’s 
(1984) conceptualization of fields and also 
to Fligstein and McAdams’ (2012) idea of 
strategic action field. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) list suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulators and others. And they 
together with Wooten and Hoffman (2008) 
and Scott (2014) emphasize that these actors 
are in networks of relationships. Indeed, 
DiMaggio (1995) regretted that the net-
work aspect of their argument had been lost. 
Padgett and Powell (2012: 2), from their 
work on fields, say ‘in the short run, actors 
create relations; in the long run, relations cre-
ate actors’.
Such relations are made performable and 
reinforced by governance and field coordi-
nating structures, practices and organiza-
tional structures that regulate and regularize 
day-to-day interactions in fields. Together, 
these elements are the ‘interlaced material, 
discursive, and organizational dimensions 
of field structure’, which align to create 
field stability (Levy & Scully, 2007: 971). It 
means that changing any one element may 
not be sustainable, if other elements overlap 
and reinforce old patterns, maintaining the 
field much as it was. Thus it is important to 
understand the set of institutions, or the insti-
tutional infrastructure and its elaboration and 
coherency in a field, in order to understand 
governance as well as field dynamics and 
change.
INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The idea of infrastructure is of the basic 
physical and organizational structures and 
facilities that are needed for the operation of 
a society or enterprise. ‘Infra’ itself refers to 
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‘below, underneath, beneath’ (Oxford 
English Dictionary). So, in examining insti-
tutional infrastructure we are looking, first, 
for the elements that provide for its elabora-
tion and coherency in a field; second, how 
such elements are organized as to overlap 
with and underpin the formal governance of 
a field.
Conceptual Roots
The origins of the concept of ‘institutional 
infrastructure’ are in comparative political 
economy (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; 
Soskice, 1991; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 
1993; Piatkowski, 2002), though the term has 
been used across multiple scholarly fields. 
The political economy work has compared 
the formal (e.g., legal and regulatory systems 
of a nation) and informal institutions (e.g., 
cultural norms and values of doing business) 
in national innovation and business systems, 
finding both influential for economic out-
comes. For example, institutional infrastruc-
ture elements of democracy (Rodrick, 1997), 
income inequality, sociopolitical stability, 
and other measures of institutional quality 
(Alesina & Perotti, 1996) have been studied 
in relation to economic growth (Gimenez & 
Sanau, 2007), and corruption, the rule of law, 
bureaucracy, repudiation of contracts and 
risk of expropriation have been studied in 
relation to economic performance. 
Institutional infrastructure is seen as the set 
of political, legal and cultural institutions 
(Boettke, 1994), that form the backdrop for 
economic activity and governance, enabling 
(or constraining) its smooth operation. These 
elements overlap, reinforce one another, and 
may sometimes substitute for one another. 
Marquis and Raynard (2015), for example, 
describe how informal institutional infra-
structural elements, such as networks and 
business groups, intermediary organizations, 
and business processes, may substitute for 
missing formal institutional infrastructure in 
emerging markets.
Work on transnationalization (Djelic & 
Quack, 2008), and globalization and world 
society theory (Drori, 2008) has also exam-
ined the development of institutional infra-
structure in the form of institutions across 
national boundaries that enable/constrain 
and govern trade (Djelic & Quack, 2008). 
There has been an increase in these inter-
national organizations, such as the World 
Trade Organization, NAFTA, GATS, and 
associated regulatory networks such as the 
International Competition Network, the SEC, 
that have become institutionalized. ‘Many 
non- governmental organizations have been 
established that engage in standard setting, 
accreditation and other forms of soft regu-
lation’ (Djelic & Quack, 2008: 311). Drori 
(2008) recognizes this development of an 
institutional infrastructure at the transnational 
level, through the lens of world society theory, 
emphasizing ‘the diffuse state of authority of 
the global system, on the role of institutional 
mechanisms in the cross-national diffusion 
of ideas and practices, and on the rationaliz-
ing and standardizing impact of international 
organizations, the professions, and the uni-
versalized models they carry’ (p. 449).
Institutional infrastructure has also been 
used to study smaller social groups. Within 
neighborhoods, institutional infrastructure 
has been used to describe ‘the level and 
quality of formal organizations in the neigh-
borhood’, measured by the existence of 
neighborhood organizations and their ability 
to influence policy makers on behalf of the 
neighborhood (Temkin & Rohe, 1998: 70). In 
education, the institutional infrastructure for 
coordinating children’s services was noted 
to include five aspects: ‘(a) convening and 
goal-structuring processes, (b) institutional 
interests and reward systems, (c) relations 
to external environments through institu-
tional activity, (d) communication linkages, 
and (e) institutional conventions’ (Smylie & 
Crowson, 1996: 3). Again, both formal and 
informal institutions are included, though it 
must be acknowledged that institutional infra-
structure at the level of smaller or more local 
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groups is affected by the societal infrastruc-
ture within which the group is embedded.
Elements of Institutional 
Infrastructure in Organizational 
Theory
In organization theory per se, the idea of 
institutional infrastructure reflects under-
standings of the embeddedness of organiza-
tions within fields and the structuration of 
fields that occurs through interactions and 
institutional activity amongst actors 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dacin, Ventresca, 
& Beal, 1999). For example, Waddock (2008) 
sees infrastructure being developed through 
activities such as certifying, assuring and 
reporting against principles, codes and stand-
ards; by forming new associations and net-
works of relations among organizations. 
Compagni, Mele and Ravasi (2015) empha-
size the importance of constructing institu-
tional infrastructure through professional 
associations and conferences to structure 
social relationships, develop field narratives 
of quality and contribute to the diffusion of 
new practices. The emphasis is on a set of 
institutions whose coherency and degree of 
elaboration underpin field activity, and inter-
act with formal governance systems.
Greenwood et  al. (2011) specifically use 
the term institutional infrastructure in devel-
oping their arguments about institutional 
complexity. They mention: collective actors 
(especially professional associations, and the 
state); social control agents; infomediaries; 
tournament rituals; theorization; mechanisms 
of enforcement; and state regulation. They 
have no definition of institutional infrastruc-
ture per se, but their descriptors are primarily 
a set of actors or structures which have the 
role of judging, governing or organizing other 
actors in the field. Collectively, they provide 
the structures by which status in the field is 
determined, by which interests and values are 
made collective and enacted, and by which 
the behavior of rank-and-file field members 
is guided or enforced. These authors see 
institutional infrastructure as important in 
producing a framework for comparing fields. 
In particular, they draw attention to and stress 
the role of collective actors such as profes-
sional associations, international, national 
and local governments. They also point to the 
processes that bind a field together as part of 
institutional infrastructure, such as mecha-
nisms of enforcement and various kinds of 
regulation or field governance. These ideas 
are taken up by Raaijmakers et al. (2015) who 
particularly mention professional associa-
tions, health and safety inspection agencies 
and media as part of institutional infrastruc-
ture that underpins the governance of the 
field. Bell, Filatotchev and Aguilera (2014) 
similarly draw attention to the importance of 
regulatory institutions, governmental organi-
zations, legislation and court decisions as 
‘primary regulative agents’. Other authors 
refer to status conferring events or structures 
such as awards (Anand & Watson, 2004) or 
quality ratings, accreditation or standards 
bodies (Sauder, 2008), conferences and pro-
fessional associations (Lampel & Meyer, 
2008; Compagni et al., 2015), fairs and film 
festivals (Moeran & Strandgaard Pedersen, 
2011), and coordinating mechanisms or col-
lective interest organizations such as industry 
collaborative R&D, lobbying or trade bodies 
(Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), market information 
providers (Marquis & Raynard, 2015), and 
legitimized structures such as organizational 
templates (Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005), as components of a 
field’s institutional infrastructure.
Thus, the concept of institutional infra-
structure is defined as the set of institutions 
that prevail in a field. This structural approach 
to understanding field dynamics provides two 
benefits: (1) redirecting attention to under-
standings of field dynamics as beyond logics 
and meaning, and (2) offering opportunity to 
compare across fields by having a means by 
which to define and typologize field condi-
tions. While the definition of institutional 
infrastructure is seemingly all encompassing, 
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what matters for understanding field dynam-
ics and comparing conditions across fields is 
considering its degree of elaboration and its 
coherency (Zietsma et al., 2017). Thus, based 
on these conceptual roots, suggestive theo-
rizing by Greenwood et  al. (2011) and our 
review of the concept and its (limited) use 
we consider main elements of institutional 
infrastructure to include collective interest 
organizations, regulators, informal govern-
ance bodies, field-configuring events, status 
differentiators, organizational templates, cat-
egories or labels, and norms.
INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND GOVERNANCE
Governance has been identified as a key 
aspect of fields (Fiss, 2007; Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Scott, 2014). Studying field-level gov-
ernance is about control, authority, influence 
and legitimacy. While these are ongoing 
themes in institutional theory (cf. Scott, 2014), 
they have not been set with the overall notion 
of governance. This is surprising given the 
emphasis that Fiss (2007), Kraatz and Block 
(2008), Fligstein and McAdam (2012) and 
Scott (2014) give to it, and also the extensive 
work that has been carried out on comparative 
organizational governance (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010). Scott (2014) states that gov-
ernance is an important subset of relational 
systems within a field. Kraatz and Block 
(2008) point out that governance has not been 
treated as something that varies across fields, 
or examined in situations of pluralism or insti-
tutional complexity (unlike work on organiza-
tional governance). Scott (2014: 231) states 
that ‘each organization field is characterized 
by a somewhat distinctive governance system’ 
thus pointing the way to a comparative analy-
sis of governance.
Thus, governance is a critical part of 
organizational fields; there has been work 
on governance actors without locating them 
within a theory of field governance; and there 
is a need for a comparative lens. But in order 
to do this, it is necessary to understand the 
difference between, and the relationship of 
governance with, institutional infrastructure.
As per our definition, we consider institu-
tional infrastructure as being more than field 
governance, yet necessarily overlapping. We 
define field governance as the formal mecha-
nisms that enable or constrain field activity 
and dynamics. For example, some of the ele-
ments of institutional infrastructure cited by 
Greenwood et  al. (2011), Bell et  al. (2014) 
and Raaijmakers et  al. (2015) clearly relate 
to field governance. Defined as ‘combina-
tions of public and private, formal and infor-
mal systems that exercise control within a 
field’ (Scott, 2014: 244), or units and pro-
cesses that ensure compliance with rules and 
facilitate ‘the overall smooth functioning 
and reproduction of the system’ (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012: 14), governance most tan-
gibly includes regulations, standards, reward 
systems and social control agents that monitor 
and enforce those regulations, standards and 
reward systems. Yet underpinning these for-
mal governance systems are cultural norms, 
taken-for-granted assumptions, scripts and 
practices, incentives and interest structures, 
roles, relationships and organizational and 
field structures, all of which are part of the 
broader institutional infrastructure of a field. 
Rather than subsuming each of these ele-
ments into governance, we refer to formal 
governance roles and structures as govern-
ance, and include the informal norms, mean-
ings, status differentiators, etc. as part of the 
institutional infrastructure, which supports 
the functioning of governance mechanisms.
Governance, then, is a subset of institu-
tional infrastructure, and both are field-level 
constructs. Institutional infrastructure covers 
the set of institutions that prevail in a field, 
including a wide range of subject positions, 
relationships, practices, events and structures, 
some of which are to do with governance and 
some of which are not. Many collective actors 
such as regulators, professional associations 
and governments are part of the governance 
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of a field. Greenwood et al. (2011) also see 
events such as trade shows and award shows 
as part of institutional infrastructure but, for 
us, these are not part of governance, which is 
about the formalized systems that ensure con-
trol and compliance within a field. Table 6.1 
summarizes the dimensions of institutional 
infrastructure and governance that we have 
developed.
INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD 
CONDITIONS
Institutional infrastructure has significant 
implications for the conditions of organiza-
tional fields, depending on the extent of its 
elaboration and its relative coherency (see 
also Zietsma et  al., 2017). Where institu-
tional infrastructure is highly elaborated and 
there is a unitary dominant logic within the 
field, we describe the field as established and 
relatively stable – the institutional infrastruc-
ture is highly coherent. Formal governance 
and informal infrastructure elements are 
plentiful in such a field and are likely to rein-
force one another significantly, leading to a 
coherent sense of what is legitimate or not 
within the organizational field. Many studies 
of field change begin with the field in an 
established state (e.g., Greenwood et  al., 
2002; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). In fields 
where there are competing logics (low coher-
ency) and highly elaborated institutional 
infrastructure, we would again see multiple 
formal governance and institutional infra-
structure elements, but these may conflict 
with one another or compete for dominance 
(Reay & Hinings, 2005; Rao, Morrill, & 
Zald, 2000). We would describe the field as 
contested. Where there are compartmental-
ized or prioritized logics within organiza-
tional fields, and highly elaborated 
institutional infrastructure and governance, 






Unions, professional associations (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Lounsbury, 2002; Purdy & 
Gray, 2009; Washington, 2004), industry associations (Porac et al., 1989; van Wijk et al., 2013)
Regulators National (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997), provincial (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010), industry, transnational 
(Djelic & Quack, 2003), geographic (Marquis, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011)
Informal governance 
bodies
Certification or standards bodies (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 2012), infomediaries 
(Deephouse & Heugens, 2009; King, 2008; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001); boundary organizations 
(O’Mahoney & Bechky, 2008); accreditation organizations (Quinn Trank &Washington, 2009; 
Zuckerman, 1999); voluntary governance organizations (Washington, 2004)
Field configuring  
events
Events, conferences (Lampel & Meyer, 2008), exogenous shocks (Zilber, 2009), trade shows (Garud, 
2008), Olympics (Glynn, 2008), fairs and festivals (Moeren & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2011)
Status differentiators Labels, measures, signals, rankings, resources, education, historical position, award ceremonies 




Professional partnerships (Greenwood, Hinings & Brown, 1990), managed professional businesses 
(Greenwood & Hinings), hybrid organizations (Battilana & Lee, 2014)
Categories/Labels Genres (Hsu, 2006), technology classes (Wry & Lounsbury, 2013), mutual funds into high and low 
risk (Lounsbury & Rao, 2004), listed corporations into industries (Zuckerman, 1999), partitioning 
of markets (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010; )
Norms Education and professional training (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002)
Relational channels Normative networks (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; van Wijk et al., 2013; Garud, Jain & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002)
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we would describe the field as arrayed in 
subfields, with coherency within subfields, 
and incoherency between them, but which 
coexist without substantial competition. 
Consider Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey’s 
(2008) description of the grass-fed beef 
sector, wherein grass-fed beef producers had 
cultural codes, markets, supply chains, etc., 
which were both separate from and different 
than those of mainstream beef producers. 
Similarly, studies of medical fields often 
include compartmentalized physician, nurs-
ing and administrative institutional infra-
structures. Table 6.2 outlines these different 
fields.
When infrastructure has a low degree of 
elaboration, we would describe fields with 
unitary logics (high coherency) as emerg-
ing or aligning. The satellite radio field, for 
example, began with an aligned sense of what 
the field was about (Navis & Glynn, 2010), 
as did the information schools described 
by Patvardhan, Gioia and Hamilton (2015). 
Fields with low coherency and limited 
elaboration of institutional infrastructure 
are described as fragmented, with compet-
ing conceptions of what is legitimate. Fields 
with compartmentalized coherency and low 
elaboration are described as having emerging 
subfields.
INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND GOVERNANCE IN THREE FIELDS
To further develop our arguments, we turn 
now to an examination of three specific 
organizational fields with differences in their 
institutional infrastructure, their governance 
and their states of development and change 
processes: those of professional service firms 
(Empson, Muzio, Broschak, & Hinings, 
2015), forestry in British Columbia, Canada 
(Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) and impact 
investing in Australia (Logue, 2014). We 
summarize our discussion in Table 6.3. The 
most effective way to illustrate how institu-
tional infrastructure and governance interact 
is by examining field level change, and thus 
we discuss changes in these fields over time.
The Professional Services Field
Historically, the professional services field 
was stable, tightly controlled and a highly 
normative space of interaction, with a unitary 
logic. Firms, professional associations, edu-
cational providers and regulators, were part 
of a highly elaborated and coherent institu-
tional infrastructure that linked them, often at 
a provincial or national level. Collective 
interest organizations worked together with 
formal regulators; consequently, processes of 
structuration were strong. As trustees of the 
rule of law, with a close compact with the 
state, this normative basis of power was 
reproduced and maintained as part of a well-
understood, elaborated, governance struc-
ture. Mandatory membership with routines 
of licensing, training and professional devel-
opment and the monitoring and disciplining 
of behavior were (and remain) critical cogni-
tive and regulative mechanisms of both gov-
ernance and institutional infrastructure. 
Governance was centrally organized around 
professional associations and regulators with 
high levels of coordination and well-defined 
processes of field entry. In addition, institu-
tional infrastructure included large firms, 
Table 6.2 Institutional infrastructure and organizational fields







within subfields, ordering of subfields)
High elaboration Established Contested Subfields
Low elaboration Aligned/emerging Fragmented Emerging subfields/fragmented
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which, while not formally part of govern-
ance, were important actors with high status 
in establishing legitimated organizational 
forms and centers of training, along with 
universities (Greenwood et  al., 1990; 
Malhotra, Morris, & Hinings, 2006; Leblebici 
& Sherer, 2015). Central to the field has been 
a well-developed organizational model or 
template, the Professional Partnership or P2 
form (Greenwood et  al., 1990; Greenwood, 
Hinings, & Prakash, 2017), reflective of 
norms of self-governance and arguably social 
hierarchy. Because of this stability in both 
governance and institutional infrastructure 
there are no significant field-configuring 
events, nor the use of categories or labels.
While the PSF field remains basically 
unitary, it has become increasingly complex 
with challenges to existing governance. This 
institutional change of recent decades has 
been a subject of much scholarly examina-
tion focusing on both field and organiza-
tional levels (for a summary see Empson 
et  al., 2015). This change was partly driven 
by actors already within this unitary field – 
clients – whose demand for services and 
increasingly transnational business activities, 
led to changing institutional infrastructure 
and governance, especially as a consequence 
of a stronger presence of a market logic into 
the field. Thus, as jurisdictional boundaries 
and demand for services have become trans-
national, there has been a shift from a highly 
normatively structured professional field to 
a globally competitive field governed by the 
market and increased regulations, standards, 
and trade agreements. PSFs have become an 
international one-stop-shop for various and 
increasingly dispersed clients.
As a result of these changes both institu-
tional infrastructure has become even more 
elaborated and governance has become more 
complex. More actors have entered the field, 
especially new kinds of collective interest 
organizations such as business and civil soci-
ety groups; clients have been increasing their 
role and strengthening their relationships 
with service providers. Indeed, the power and 
status of clients has increased. Regulation has 
become more complex with oversight boards 
at both the national, transnational and interna-
tional levels being added to existing regulatory 
structures. More networks that cross national 
boundaries have developed and this has pro-
duced informal governance bodies with ‘soft 
regulation’ (Djelic & Quack, 2008). All of 
this has involved the proliferation of rules, 
standards, classification schemes, evaluation 
procedures, and attempted standardization and 
formalization of public reporting across policy 
fields with international trade agreements. 
There are more implicit rules, templates and 
schemas. Thus, within this the institutional 
infrastructure has become both more complex 
and more fragmented as it extends over multi-
ple jurisdictions. Power has also shifted some-
what to large transnational firms.
The P2 organizational form is now con-
tested and some have suggested that there 
has been some transformation to a Managed 
Professional Business (Cooper, Hinings, 
Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Malhotra et al., 
2006). This reflects the stretching of field 
boundaries (Morgan & Quack, 2006; Djelic 
& Quack, 2008; Bousseba & Morgan, 2015) 
and the presence of a stronger market logic.
There are many more actors involved in 
field governance. While professional asso-
ciations remain important in establishing cre-
dentials and controlling the flow of labor but 
there are now competition authorities, stock 
market regulators and public oversight boards 
and, with the field becoming transnational, 
actors such as the World Trade Organization 
and transnational regulatory bodies are active. 
Both regulators and collective interest organi-
zations have increased in number.
All of this represents a change in normative 
structure due to the breakdown of the com-
pact between the professions and the state. 
These new kinds of regulators and collec-
tive interest organizations are introduced as 
guardians of the public interest, an acknowl-
edgement that the professional associations 
have not been concerned with this as a pri-
mary function. They are supported by new 
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actors such as NGOs, who are also involved 
in standard setting and developing new cate-
gorizations, often drawing power from inter-
national agreements as they monitor activity 
within the field. However, the national, sin-
gular professional field system still exists and 
provides barriers to entry for labor. This his-
torical structuration for the continued opera-
tion of the field has been preserved.
Thus, the governance of the field is both 
voluntary (through certifications, market-
ing agreements, trade associations, lobbying, 
etc.) and mandatory by the state (local, pro-
vincial, national). It is normative (professional 
associations, education), and negotiated (as 
transnational, many stakeholders), as well as 
having elements of coercion (through pres-
sures from stakeholders) and traditional disci-
plinary measures relating to practice. The shift 
from national, singular professional service 
fields to transnational, multi-service profes-
sional service fields is seemingly the blend-
ing of structurally equivalent fields. While 
field boundaries and practices have expanded, 
and pressures of globalization have loosened 
national controls, professional service firms 
have maintained normative power (and in 
a sense, the closure of the field) through the 
preservation of institutional infrastructure that 
enables the reproduction of ideals of self-gov-
ernance and societal positioning, and so con-
tinued operation of the field.
While the change that we are describing 
in this field may appear radical in both insti-
tutional infrastructure and governance, it has 
occurred over a lengthy period of time and 
was, in part, endogenous. What we actually 
see is both continuity and change (Malhotra 
& Hinings, 2015). Table 6.3 summarizes the 
professional service firm field’s institutional 
infrastructure and governance.
The Forestry Field
In their study of the field of forestry in 
British Columbia (BC), Zietsma and 
Lawrence (2010) explored the institutional 
work of actors as the field underwent consid-
erable change over a 20-year period. At the 
beginning of their study period (1985), a 
small number of long-established forestry 
firms and the provincial government together 
(and in close relationship) dominated the 
field, which was highly regulated, had a 
highly elaborated institutional infrastructure 
and featured a unitary, highly coherent indus-
trial forestry logic that emphasized gaining 
maximum economic value (profitability and 
jobs) from forest resources, and replanting 
them for future use. A number of collective 
interest organizations existed, including 
industry associations (again, dominated by 
the elite forestry firms) and organizing bodies 
for shared research and development, inter-
national trade and marketing. A strong union 
organized forest workers, and engaged in 
sector-wide bargaining. Independent suppli-
ers of transportation were organized into a 
Truck Loggers Association. The professional 
association of foresters worked with the fac-
ulties of forestry at BC universities to develop 
the normative framework for forest practices, 
to materialize the norms into practices and 
train and socialize professional foresters into 
these normative/practice frameworks. This 
centralized and mutually reinforcing set of 
institutional infrastructure elements served to 
produce stable governance institutions and 
thus maintain consistent action within the 
field, determining which actors had influence 
on field decision-making. Indeed, institu-
tional infrastructure elements almost com-
pletely reinforced one another.
From the 1960s onward, however, there 
has been an increase in societal concern for 
the environment. The environmental field is a 
social movement field (Zietsma et al., 2017) 
with its own institutional infrastructure. 
Various environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOS) play different roles 
(Bertels, Hoffman, & de Jordy, 2014): edu-
cational institutions teach principles and 
practices of environmental science and man-
agement, and consultants, business organiza-
tions and government agencies are dedicated 
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to environmental improvements and manage-
ment. The field’s institutional infrastructure 
is decentralized with many actors, informal 
networks and little to no formal govern-
ance. Key normative principles exist, how-
ever. They involve the valuing of the natural 
environment for its own sake, preventing or 
mitigating climate change impacts, halting 
environmental degradation and loss of habi-
tat and biodiversity, promoting sustainable 
natural resource use, reducing risks and prob-
lems of waste/emissions and disposal, air and 
water quality, etc.1 The environmental field 
seeks to add environmental issues to multiple 
other fields’ governance arrangements and 
infrastructure, focusing on fields in which 
environmental degradation is occurring. 
Environmental field members often seek to 
have new governance arrangements applied 
to other fields such as increased environmen-
tal regulations, monitoring and enforcement, 
along with multi-stakeholder consultation 
processes and sustainability certifications. 
Forestry has been an early focus for the field. 
ENGO campaigners that focused on forestry 
developed a set of practices, principles, rela-
tionships and mechanisms, which they used 
to gain access to and influence within the 
BC forestry field: in effect, they formed an 
issue field with two subfields, with divergent 
infrastructure, to challenge the BC forestry 
field. Their relational channels included other 
ENGOs, First Nations peoples,2 the media, 
the public (through campaign events), regu-
lators related to forestry and the environment 
in BC, and eventually, other businesses that 
used or sold wood or paper products. Initially, 
they were not part of the normal relational 
channels of forestry firms or the government, 
since at the beginning, they lacked the atten-
tion of both the voters and the customers of 
the forest companies, and there was no role in 
the forestry field for actors of their type. They 
thus were excluded from the power structure 
of the field, and had no impact on field gov-
ernance. The forestry field’s infrastructure 
provided multiple, overlapping barriers for 
their influence.
Over time, however, the ENGOs were able 
to gain the normative support of many vot-
ers, and thus had some impact on government 
action. In response, forestry firms activated 
the employees and forest-dependent commu-
nity members into an ‘astroturf’ (or pseudo-
grass roots) group, to countervail the green 
voters, and lobbied their government net-
work, curtailing government action. All of 
this points to an increasingly complex infra-
structure and an existing governance system 
that was under pressure but not yet replaced 
by a new, legitimated one.
ENGOs then pursued a market-based strat-
egy, convincing international customers of 
the forestry firms to demand more sustainable 
practices. Once these demands came from 
the field’s usual relational channels (cus-
tomers), thus becoming consistent with the 
market logic, the forestry firms very quickly 
began to assimilate infrastructural elements 
desired by ENGOs into their own field infra-
structure. Clear-cutting was abandoned by 
the lead firm overnight (in 1998), and others 
followed soon after. Sustainability certifica-
tions were adopted. Lead forestry firms and 
environmental groups together formed a col-
lective interest organization called the Coast 
Forest Conservation Initiative, which con-
ducted joint research and participated influ-
entially in multi-stakeholder consultation 
structures. These structures were field-config-
uring processes to negotiate new eco-system 
based management forest practices to protect 
ancient forests, wildlife corridors and First 
Nations’ rights (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). 
Together, members of the stakeholder con-
sultation structure lobbied the government 
to change forest regulations to mandate these 
ecosystem-based practices, ensuring stake-
holder interests were permanently embedded 
in forestry field governance arrangements, 
and over time into the forestry field’s logic, 
through continued elaboration of infrastruc-
ture (certification practices and reports, 
environmental reports, changes in harvest-
ing models embedded in the organizational 
template, etc.). Thus, out of that changing 
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institutional infrastructure, a new governance 
system was instituted that included the inter-
ests of a wider range of actors, new networks 
and changed power relations. New infra-
structure came into play when new actors 
demanded influence – initially they were 
unable to influence formal governance mech-
anisms, yet eventually, through relationships 
and changes to institutional infrastructure ele-
ments that the environmentalists could gain 
access to, there were new regulations gov-
erning the field. Stakeholder concerns also 
became embedded (and performative) within 
firms, and within the institutional infrastruc-
ture of the forestry field.
From this case example, we saw that logic 
(meaning and practice), relational channels, 
power and governance elements that ENGOs 
sought to bring into the BC forestry field 
were blocked for many years by elements of 
the forestry field’s infrastructure for which 
they were inconsistent. These changes would 
reduce the power of firms and their regula-
tors, contradict their established field logic 
and violate field governance arrangements, 
and they came from new actors outside of 
field relational channels. Each of these mutu-
ally reinforcing infrastructural elements had 
to be unlocked before sustainable forest prac-
tices could be instituted. When the change 
came, however, it happened quite rapidly 
across each of the elements of institutional 
infrastructure, producing a new governance 
structure. Table 6.3 summarizes the for-
estry field’s institutional infrastructure and 
governance.
The Impact Investing Field
In contrast to the established and historical 
fields of professional services and forestry, 
impact investing is a nascent field with lower 
elaboration of institutional infrastructure, yet 
rather unitary in its emergence, making it an 
aligned/emerging field. Its emerging govern-
ance, both formal and informal is grounded 
in the idea, and so the rules, of a market. The 
practice of impact investing involves invest-
ing in companies, organizations and funds 
with the intention of generating measurable 
social and environmental impacts as well as 
financial returns. This market-building social 
movement gained speed after the Global 
Financial Crisis, with philanthropists, global 
institutions, banks and consulting firms sup-
porting the notion (with varying motivations) 
that profit-seeking investment can generate 
social and environmental good, and could go 
towards addressing the complex, multidisci-
plinary, intractable and ‘wicked’ problems 
(Rittel & Weber, 1973) facing nations and the 
world in general.
As a new field, impact investing is emerg-
ing at the intersection of other fields – phi-
lanthropy, investment and finance, corporate 
social responsibility and social entrepreneur-
ship. The institutional infrastructure is emerg-
ing in an interstitial space; this is interesting 
for institutional scholars as interstitial spaces 
(between fields) and field-to-field relations 
(Evans & Kay, 2008; Furnari, 2014; Pache 
& Santos, 2010; Van Wijk, Stam, Elfring, 
Zietsma, & den Hond, 2013) are neglected 
yet theoretically generative areas (Zietsma, 
et al, 2017). In impact investing, the desired 
governance and institutional infrastructure 
of the field seems rather coherent, despite a 
diversity of stakeholders being involved in 
market-building efforts, drawn from the idea 
of a self-governing market. While the field 
itself may be emerging from the intersection 
of several fields, the dominant logic is that 
of the market, which is present to a greater 
or lesser degree in each of the surrounding 
fields. The idea of the all-knowing efficient 
market, and the well-institutionalized scripts 
that come with it, is translated and transferred 
from other sectors (Wall Street but also edu-
cation, health); the consequent materials 
required for this impact investing market are 
drawn from taken-for-granted assumptions 
and ideas about what a market needs to func-
tion – supply, demand, rankings, ratings and 
those to do the ratings (Logue, 2014). The 
market thus becomes the central, naturalizing 
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analogy for organizing and building institu-
tional infrastructure for this field, providing 
a powerful cognitive force (Logue, Clegg, & 
Gray, 2016).
If we look at the emergence of this field 
in Australia, this recent market-building 
activity was led by the government (Logue, 
2014), which set about structuring the rela-
tions between diverse and disparate actors 
through a Senate Inquiry, an early field-con-
figuring event. Some existing collective inter-
est groups, such as associations of charities 
and non-profit groups, participated, although 
they were few when compared to the diverse 
range and large number of other organiza-
tions – banks, religious organizations, inves-
tors, superannuation funds, social enterprises, 
corporate foundations, etc.
Emanating from this field-configuring 
event was a dominant discourse that the sup-
ply side of the market was under developed. 
So to support early market-building activity, 
the government provided matching funding 
to catalyze the establishment of three impact 
investing firms (supply side). The actions and 
practices of these firms are increasingly seen as 
the appropriate way to perform impact invest-
ing, particularly the measuring and public 
reporting on such investments. Formal regu-
lation is lagging, with little formal structuring 
and actors needing to operate within existing 
frameworks from their fields of origin. For 
example, non-profit structures and restric-
tions on equity financing, public reporting on 
charitable donations, corporate financial struc-
tures (such as superannuation firms and trusts) 
requiring pursuit of maximum financial return 
(referred to as the ‘sole purpose test’ in the 
Superannuation Industry Act) and not allow-
ing pursuit of lesser financial return for social 
return. The institutional infrastructure was 
being built up, with the government taking a 
leading role in identifying actors, but without 
any real specification of relationships. Thus, 
pre-existing networks came into play and 
power rested with established market actors.
Informal governance of the field is emerg-
ing through certifying social impact through 
new global organizations such as BLab, 
which awards companies a BCorporation 
certification if they are achieving financial, 
social and environmental returns. This certi-
fication can be withdrawn if a company fails 
to maintain this triple bottom line perfor-
mance. This certification is increasingly used 
as a short-cut for impact investors needing 
due diligence on possible investment oppor-
tunities, as evidenced by some social stock 
exchanges only listing BCorporation certi-
fied companies. Globally, the market also 
seems to be converging on another measure-
ment system of impact investments, Global 
Impact Investment Ratings System (GIIRS) 
that measures impact of companies, invest-
ments, funds and fund managers. Control 
partly rests with rating agencies. Beyond cer-
tification, other status differentiators are not 
strong, and field positions in this early stage 
are mainly based on resources such as capital.
Even at this early stage, the field is seem-
ingly converging around common organi-
zational templates and models. Although 
there is yet to be an agreed-upon archetypal 
organizational template (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1993) for such hybrid organiza-
tions (Battilana & Lee, 2014), the discourse 
frequently focuses on for-profit models 
suitable for generating impact investing, 
providing debt and equity options for such 
investors. For example, debate continues as 
to whether Australia needs a new legal cor-
porate form such as the UK’s Community 
Interest Corporations, or the US Benefit 
Corporation to address such investor needs. 
In this way, the charity or non-profit mod-
els becomes just one organizational form in 
the new social economy (Logue & Zappala, 
2014). Field configuring debates increasingly 
categorize and label organizations as ‘social 
enterprises’, these labels determining who 
is considered eligible (or legitimate even) to 
participate in this new field, particularly on 
the demand side (social enterprises, social 
businesses, non-profits, charities). This labe-
ling begins to set the boundaries of the field 
and elaborate institutional infrastructure.
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All of this market-building activity further 
supports the emergence of educational actors 
offering programs to get social enterprises 
‘investor ready’, by both private intermediar-
ies and consulting programs offering accel-
erators programs, to universities offering 
Masters programs (within Business Schools) 
specializing in social entrepreneurship. Not 
only does this educate incoming actors into 
this market, it establishes the dominant cog-
nitive framework from business (as opposed 
to say, social justice). Having formally recog-
nized postgraduate courses also goes towards 
aligning and legitimizing the activities of this 
nascent field by other fields and contributes 
to establishing a normative framework for 
field activity. Thus, governance at this nas-
cent stage is more normative, based on influ-
ence and attempts to educate actors, rather 
than structural or based on formal regulation 
or rights.
What is also interesting in the emergence 
of this market, is the frequent cry in Australia 
and many other national markets, that there is 
a lack of ‘investor ready enterprises’, or that 
investors also need to be educated. So, while 
there is both a visible demand side to this 
market, and a willing supply side, the market 
itself fails to emerge without the necessary 
institutional infrastructure in place. There is 
yet to emerge a common language or mean-
ing system through which these different 
groups of actors can readily communicate and 
interact. A body of literature across the social 
sciences has demonstrated how markets are 
socially constructed rather than being entities 
‘out there’, and has highlighted the crucial 
role of culture and politics involved in the 
organization of markets and in creating the 
governing ‘rules of the game’ (e.g., North, 
1990; Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012; Padgett & Powell, 2012). These cate-
gories, labels, certifications, practices, events 
and educational programs begin to provide 
the necessary infrastructure for these actors 
to frequently and fatefully meet, connect 
and transact. This infrastructure enables and 
supports the development of relationships, 
norms and beliefs amongst actors, and so the 
necessary governance and social structure of 
the market to form (McKague, Zietsma, & 
Oliver, 2015).
As a nascent, emerging field, we see an 
initially fragmented, unstructured and decen-
tralized institutional infrastructure with 
such governance as there is being imported 
from intersecting fields. Power in the field 
rests both with governments as they attempt 
to organize the field and also through the 
acceptance of market-based approaches. The 
elements of governance begin to emerge in 
certification, educational programs and field-
configuring events but there is still not a 
definitive governance system. Table 6.3 sum-
marizes the impact investing’s institutional 
infrastructure and governance.
Cross-field Comparison
Overall, our three examples show both major 
contrasts and some similarities. In terms of 
an overall field description we categorize the 
institutional infrastructure of professional 
services as established to begin with but 
becoming more complex and with challenges 
to existing infrastructure and governance. 
Forestry is also initially established but 
becomes contested and then compartmental-
ized into distinct subfields. These two fields 
began with a period of stasis, with a set of 
mutually reinforcing, highly elaborated, 
institutional infrastructure elements that 
maintained and governed the field. In both 
fields, there was a strong relationship 
between the state and the professions (PSF) 
and firms (forestry), which enabled signifi-
cant self-governance (especially among pro-
fessions), or which gave considerable input 
by firms and professions into field regula-
tions. Thus, collective interest organizations 
represented firms and the profession with 
key roles for the professional associations 
(PSF) and the industry associations (for-
estry), both of which were dominated by 
members from the top firms in the field. 
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Status differentiation in these fields was 
based in the large firms. In both cases, educa-
tion and professional associations reinforced 
field norms, practices and regulations. In 
both fields, what one ‘must do’ to be legiti-
mate was relatively clear, prescriptive and 
policed through self-regulation and well-
established categorization. Organizational 
models were highly institutionalized.
While the starting point for these two fields 
was similar, the nature of the changes in 
both institutional infrastructure and govern-
ance were different. In the PSF field, we saw 
endogenous and incremental processes of 
change, largely unimpeded by infrastructural 
barriers and existing governance. In contrast, 
in the forest industry, the field’s institutional 
infrastructure acted as a significant barrier 
to change, and little change happened until 
a radical shift appeared which seemed quite 
sudden. What accounts for these differences? 
In both cases, new logics arose in society 
that were brought into the field – globaliza-
tion and market logics for the PSF field, and 
environmental and social justice logics for 
the forestry field – yet they had dramatically 
different effects as they interacted with the 
institutional infrastructure and governance of 
the respective fields.
In the PSF field, the new logics had some 
complementarity with existing logics, which 
already included norms for client service 
and profitability, but they also emerged from 
‘normal’ (cognitively and morally legitimate) 
sources, both collective actors and high sta-
tus field members. PSF firms were asked by 
their customers to expand their practices both 
internationally and by discipline (Greenwood 
et  al., 2002), which fit with PSF firms’ 
norms of client service and profitability. 
Governments, for their part, were also experi-
encing strong pressures for globalization and 
market logics from many other sources at the 
same time, including other states and state 
agencies, lobbyists, voters and other influ-
encers. These logics were seen as modern and 
fully consistent with a government’s focus on 
the economic prosperity of their state.
These logics, and the organizational 
structures and practices that materialized 
them, also did not disrupt existing power 
structures and professional norms to a great 
extent. PSFs remained largely self-governing 
although new organizational models were 
available. While states saw their power fall-
ing because of the increasingly transnational 
nature of the business, new regulators were 
added to take part in governance and new 
regulations and reporting requirements were 
introduced to protect their citizens’ inter-
ests. At the transnational level, new collec-
tive actors and regulators came into being; 
NGOs worked to counterbalance rising PSF 
power (and the rising market logic) by push-
ing for voluntary governance arrangements 
in order to preserve professional standards. 
While there were frictions with each change, 
the changes were largely consistent with, and 
preservative of, existing institutional infra-
structure, and thus they proceeded relatively 
smoothly. No new categories or labels were 
introduced.
In the BC forestry case where two fields 
came together, the environmental field’s 
institutional infrastructure was inconsist-
ent with that of the forestry field in multiple 
ways: based in different norms, and advocat-
ing different practices. It also emerged from 
illegitimate relational channels, threatening 
the traditional power structure of the forestry 
field and expressly violating existing govern-
ance arrangements. The path of change took 
much longer and shifted more radically than 
incrementally when change occurred. New 
collective actors were introduced and this led 
to more status differentiation. Forestry firms 
used their relationships with regulators to 
block changes, and activated their employ-
ees and forest-dependent communities to 
provide a normative counter-argument to 
those of ENGOs based on economic prosper-
ity. Thus, the various collective actors were 
in conflict. Furthermore, they normatively 
supported and policed each other to main-
tain solidarity against these divergent pres-
sures. When the pressures for change finally 
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came from legitimate channels (voters for 
the government, and customers for the for-
estry firms), and when they became more 
consistent with the forestry field’s market-
based logic because of customer demands, 
forest companies changed their practices and 
began in earnest to negotiate new govern-
ance arrangements that eventually became 
inscribed in law and organizational struc-
tures. Governance became more inclusive 
and institutional infrastructure more sup-
portive of a range of actors and regulators 
together with new norms.
The difference between the PSF case and 
the forestry case is the relative consistency 
or inconsistency with existing infrastructure 
that determined the path of change (and the 
consequent resistance to the changes faced in 
fields). In two highly institutionalized fields, 
with mutually supporting infrastructural ele-
ments, we can expect changes that are incon-
sistent with institutional infrastructure to take 
longer and appear more dramatic, as the mul-
tiple, mutually reinforcing infrastructural ele-
ments act as supports for each other. Opening 
the door to change was difficult because the 
door had multiple locks. By contrast, when 
changes were more consistent with institu-
tional infrastructure, the door was at least 
partially open, and the changes that did occur 
took place relatively uneventfully over time.
Even challenges that appear inconsistent 
with the field’s infrastructure may lead to 
incremental change, however, if field elites 
recognize a potential threat that they feel 
they can control, maintaining existing power 
structures. In the mainstream tourism field 
in the Netherlands, for example, incumbents 
faced demands from a sustainable tourism 
field in a fragmented state (limited institu-
tional infrastructure and competing logics) 
(van Wijk et  al., 2013). The mainstream 
tourism field’s institutional infrastructure, 
by contrast, was much more elaborated and 
internally consistent. Incumbents from the 
trade association and top firms tried to co-
opt the weakly structured sustainable tour-
ism field, creating a governance framework 
that left existing power structures intact, 
and incrementally assimilated the sustain-
able tourism field’s interests into the tourism 
industry’s field infrastructure.
When we examine the impact investing 
field, we see a different story again. As an 
emerging field, its institutional infrastruc-
ture is largely undeveloped. As a result there 
is considerable experimentation with vari-
ous governance forms, negotiating different 
arrangements, and seeing what sticks. There 
is very little resistance to that experimenta-
tion, as there is a very limited institutional 
infrastructure to block it. Collective actors 
are absent; regulation is ambiguous; there is 
little status differentiation; there are no taken-
for-granted organizational templates; and 
norms diverge, especially around market and 
social practices.
Constraints instead come from surround-
ing fields in which members of the impact 
investing field hold legitimate subject posi-
tions, as such subject positions have yet to be 
clearly defined and legitimated in the impact 
investing field itself. These constraints iden-
tify what members must not do, but do not 
prescribe with much certainty what should be 
done. Until infrastructure elements become 
developed (and mutually reinforcing), how-
ever, there is considerably more freedom for 
experimentation, but a corresponding lack of 
certainty around what is legitimate within the 
field.
IMPLICATIONS
A major aim was to draw together the ideas of 
institutional infrastructure, a subset of which 
is field governance, and use them as a basis 
for comparison across fields. In dealing with 
the rather limited literature within institu-
tional theory for each concept we developed a 
definition of governance as the formal mech-
anisms of roles, structures, rules and stand-
ards that maintain the ‘rules of the game’ 
within a field. Institutional infrastructure we 
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defined as including, but wider than govern-
ance. The main elements of institutional 
infrastructure include collective interest 
organizations, regulators, informal govern-
ance bodies, field configuring events, status 
differentiators, organizational templates, cat-
egories or labels, and norms. We have further 
suggested that the institutional infrastructure 
of a field can be described in terms of degrees 
of elaboration (high, low) and coherency 
(unitary, competing, compartmentalized).
We then illustrated the nature of institu-
tional infrastructure and governance, and their 
interrelationship through the analysis of three 
fields, professional service firms, forestry 
and impact investing. From the comparison 
of the governance and infrastructure of those 
fields, we were able to describe different con-
figurations of institutional infrastructure and 
governance, focusing on their relative coher-
ency and elaboration to identify six field 
conditions. In doing so, we have argued that 
these field conditions, based on the field’s 
institutional infrastructure and governance, 
are important for understanding field dynam-
ics, since infrastructural states affect pro-
cesses of field creation, maintenance and 
change. Our analysis and comparison of the 
three fields of professional services, forestry 
and impact investing is a first step in show-
ing what these differences are and the effects 
that they have. What becomes important are 
the implications of this analysis for a more 
general understanding of field differences 
and institutional change, field emergence and 
institutional work.
Implications for Theorizing Field 
Differences and Institutional 
Change
Some of the primary topics of the past 
decade, i.e., institutional entrepreneurship, 
institutional work and institutional logics, 
have often directly or indirectly centered on 
change at the field level. It is surprising then 
that the issue of what exactly has been 
changing within a field and how change takes 
place has been relatively under-theorized. As 
Greenwood et al. (2011) point out, there is a 
lack of frameworks for understanding fields. 
We have discussed elements of institutional 
infrastructure as formal governance, collec-
tive interest organizations, informal govern-
ance, field-configuring events, status 
differentiators, organizational models or tem-
plates, categories and labels, and norms, 
which reinforce each other in established 
fields, but may conflict or be compartmental-
ized in other fields. Such elements form the 
basis for a classification of fields with the 
idea that they come together in a circum-
scribed set of ways. However, as institutional 
theory has developed a very strong emphasis 
on changes in, and contestation over, institu-
tional logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Thornton, 
Jones, & Kury, 2005) as a central concern 
over the past decade (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008; Thornton et  al., 2012), these other 
infrastructural elements of fields – that may 
enable or constrain change – have been 
neglected.
Our focus on institutional infrastructure 
in the case studies shows that logics alone 
cannot account for institutional dynam-
ics. Logics are not disconnected influences 
which change fields automatically when they 
arise. They are attached to particular groups 
of actors, and come with their own relational 
channels, bases for legitimacy, and power 
and governance structures, and are materi-
alized in various elements of institutional 
infrastructure. Our examination of the dif-
ferent cases suggests that logics which travel 
through the field’s institutionalized relational 
channels appear to stimulate change while 
those that do not are more likely to be ignored 
or resisted. When they disrupt existing power 
structures or violate existing governance 
arrangements, they are likely to be resisted 
even more fiercely (Furnari, 2016). We 
argue that the infrastructural elements oper-
ate in concert, and thus must be considered 
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together. When infrastructural elements over-
lap and reinforce one another, they each func-
tion as separate locks on a door that acts as 
a barrier to institutional change. Each of the 
locks must be unlocked before the door can 
be opened and institutional change can occur.
On the other hand, the lack of reinforc-
ing institutional infrastructure in an emerg-
ing field, while it creates considerable room 
for experimentation and change, limits field 
members’ ability to define and acquire legiti-
macy, and thus contributes to ambiguity, and 
potentially, the need to draw on ill-suited 
infrastructure from adjacent fields. Weak 
infrastructure may leave a field open to colo-
nization or cooptation (van Wijk et al., 2013), 
and change may be frequent, but difficult to 
institutionalize.
When fields feature institutional com-
plexity, with diverging meanings, practices 
and prescriptions for action, institutional 
infrastructure may be organized in compet-
ing subfields within a field, such as the BC 
forestry field containing the sustainable 
forestry field (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), 
which is consistent with the issue fields that 
Hoffman (1999) identified. In these cases, 
different sets of institutional infrastructure 
exist in the field among different groups of 
actors and each subfield’s proponents may 
compete vigorously for dominance in the 
field, as we saw, for example, with alternative 
dispute resolution (Rao et al., 2000). On the 
other hand, subfields may co-exist in fields 
if their jurisdictions are bounded and they 
themselves preserve a hierarchical ordering 
and governance that manages the relations 
among them (O’Mahoney & Bechky, 2008; 
Raynard, 2016).
While not comprehensive, our illustra-
tions reveal that considering institutional 
infrastructure as a whole is central to the 
understanding of institutional dynamics, 
and different configurations of institutional 
infrastructure are associated with different 
patterns of institutional change in response 
to challenges. This insight is  critical. While 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) idea of 
structuration suggests that fields ‘settle 
down’ into established sets of actors with 
formal, legitimated relationships, that view 
is not supported by work of the past decade 
which suggests, at least in part, that there 
is less field stability than initially theorized 
(Heugens & Lander, 2009; Greenwood et al., 
2011). All fields are subject to change, and 
that change is in the elements of institutional 
infrastructure. The characteristics of the 
infrastructural elements, we argue, impact 
the pace and scope of change (Amis, Slack, 
& Hinings, 2002). By developing a better 
understanding of the mutually reinforcing 
nature of institutions that prevail in fields, we 
can better understand when they are likely 
to change and when change is more likely to 
be symbolic, temporary resisted or blocked 
altogether.
While we have come some way in iden-
tifying the effects of infrastructure configu-
rations on institutional dynamics, we are 
primarily laying down a framework and 
posing a number of issues that require fur-
ther attention; there is significant work to 
do. A central research issue is to identify a 
typology of infrastructural configurations 
and their effects on pathways of institutional 
change under different conditions.
Implications in Understanding 
Field Emergence
Our example of impact investing, a setting of 
field emergence, directs attention to a broader 
gap in organizational institutional literature on 
processes of field emergence and construction 
(Padgett & Powell, 2012), and how this occurs 
in contemporary settings. Indeed, the issue of 
processes of emergence of not only markets 
but organizational forms, fields and practices 
more broadly is of broader concern in organi-
zational studies (Padgett & Powell, 2012; see 
Maguire et al., 2004; Munir & Phillips, 2005; 
Khaire & Wadwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 
2010). Our example shows that the character-
istics of emerging fields makes them an 
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important area of study due to the uncertainty 
in the institutional order (providing scope for 
institutional entrepreneurs) and also how they 
develop given there are fewer isomorphic 
pressures (with the absence of shared values, 
established norms, or leaders to mimic) 
(Maguire et  al., 2004). There are two main 
insights for institutional infrastructure. First, 
some existing work (Weber et al., 2008; Navis 
& Glynn, 2010) implicitly refers to institu-
tional infrastructure through a consideration 
of categories, labels and cultural codes. This 
work could be extended to explicitly consider 
how these categories (so central to the process 
of emergence) are then mutually reinforced in 
the development of the institutional infrastruc-
ture of the field, shaping governance and field 
dynamics. Several studies (Weber et al., 2008; 
Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 
2010; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011; 
Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Patvardhan et  al., 
2015) have focused on the development of 
claims and meaning around collective identi-
ties, these often being manifested in categories 
and cultural codes that discursively get ‘filled 
out’ and locked into place by associated evalu-
ation criteria, and reinforced by audience rec-
ognition and repeated application via audience 
decision making. Furthermore, the perfor-
mance of these categories and codes create 
new relational channels, and new practices 
and governance arrangements. Categories 
thus become part of the institutional infra-
structure of a field, through a process of stake-
holders debating, contesting, performing and 
sense-making, eventually becoming taken-for-
granted (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Grodal, 
Gotsopoulos, & Suarez, 2015; Gurses & 
Ozcan, 2015; Patvardhan et al., 2015). These 
categories and their enactment contribute to 
the institutional infrastructure. This fosters 
field-level identity, cohesion and also differen-
tiation from adjacent fields (Khaire & 
Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010; 
Weber et al., 2008).
Second, fields are emerging often at the 
intersection of other fields, so institutional 
infrastructure from other fields may be 
borrowed or cobbled together (in a process 
of bricolage), and may be inadvertently con-
straining or competing. Fields often emerge 
from disparate, heterogeneous actors using 
varying resources and materials (Lounsbury 
& Crumley, 2007) to forge innovation via 
new relations and networks of activities. As 
we note in our example of impact investing, 
fields often emerge in spaces between fields, 
or from field-to-field relations (Evans & Kay, 
2008; Pache & Santos, 2010; Van Wijk et al., 
2013; Furnari, 2014). What we may observe 
by focusing on institutional infrastructure is 
the power bases and resources that are drawn 
upon (for example from other nearby or 
related fields) in developing or transforming 
structures for interaction and eventual gov-
ernance (see, for example, Furnari, 2016). 
It directs our attention to the sets of institu-
tions that will enable fields to coalesce and 
cohere, enabling their operation. We note that 
the institutional infrastructure does not have 
to be developed collectively, but efforts and 
activities need to at least be aligned towards 
achieving a common agenda and mutually 
reinforcing for a field to emerge. Emerging 
at the intersection of these fields, we may 
see infrastructure borrowed, transposed, 
and translated from nearby fields. How it 
becomes mutually reinforcing amongst such 
diversity and possible contestation is an inter-
esting line of inquiry in understanding field 
dynamics (Furnari, 2014, 2016).
Implications for Institutional Work
We recognize that the institutional infrastruc-
ture of a field is created, maintained and 
disrupted by organizational actors (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & 
Leca, 2011); their lived experience is both 
structuring and structured by that same insti-
tutional infrastructure – the paradox of 
embedded agency. Recently Lawrence et al. 
(2011) described how institutional work 
involves the ‘physical or mental effort aimed 
at affecting an institutions or set of 
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institutions’ (2011: 53), a set of institutions 
being how we conceptualize the institutional 
infrastructure of a field.
As such, we are cautious not to privilege 
infrastructure over agency in our theorizing, 
specifically issues of intentionality, effort and 
power of actors (Lawrence et al., 2011) and 
the ‘need to consider the permanent recursive 
and dialectical interaction’ that we observe 
between actors and institutional infrastruc-
ture (Lawrence et al., 2011: 55). This is high-
lighted in our forestry field example where 
the interrelation between institutional work 
(practice work and boundary work) and peri-
ods of either stability or change provide a 
more nuanced account of field dynamics.
The capacity to generate change may be 
related to individual subject positions occu-
pied in a field (Battilana, 2006), and we 
argue that those positions may be reinforced 
by the prevailing institutional infrastructure. 
The various elements of institutional infra-
structure may be defended or challenged by 
existing or new actors. There may be actors 
who intentionally maintain certain pieces of 
infrastructure, such as certification and rat-
ing systems, or professional licensing. This 
may be done at a local level, yet have broader 
field level effects in mutually reinforcing 
other elements of the field. This effort may 
be focused or distributed, coordinated or 
uncoordinated, complementary or contradic-
tory, as actors work within the field to main-
tain various parts of infrastructure, or when 
faced with external challenges. For exam-
ple, related to our example of Professional 
Services Firms, Quack (2007) shows how in 
transnational law-making, legal professionals 
perform institutional work via practice and 
politicking, with each form of institutional 
work supporting the other.
We may also see the interaction between 
institutional work and institutional infra-
structure in the struggle to transform, elabo-
rate or expand infrastructure as individuals 
navigate the pressures of ‘must do’, ‘must 
not do’ and ‘may do’, or similarly the strug-
gles and contestation observed in settings 
of field emergence. This also connects to 
power bases of the institutional infrastruc-
ture and perhaps particular groups of actors 
who control elements of infrastructure – for 
example, lawyers maintaining control of 
professional licensing and so somewhat pre-
serving the self-governance of the field, even 
with new organizational forms such as MPB. 
Institutional infrastructure may produce sys-
tematic bias (for example, application pro-
cesses for prestigious universities), it may 
privilege one group over others in the pro-
duction and reinforcement of field positions, 
and in doing so silence some groups or create 
barriers for others. Importantly, this consid-
eration of institutional work, or rather agency 
and action, reveals how institutional infra-
structure of fields is metaphorically ‘alive’. It 
may be taken-for-granted and solidified, but 
it is so because of the ongoing institutional 
work being performed.
Our point is that institutional infrastructure 
is an integral part of institutional work. When 
creating, maintaining or transforming a field, 
the kinds of institutional work being done 
are critically about institutional infrastruc-
ture, the institutions of governance, power, 
legitimacy and control. While the concept of 
institutional work introduces an important 
element of agency into institutional theory it 
is important to go beyond the classification of 
types of work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) 
to analyzing what is being worked on, i.e., 
institutional infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
We have observed that the institutional infra-
structure of fields, its elaboration, and the 
way it coheres or diverges, has substantial 
implications for institutional change dynam-
ics, field emergence and agency within fields. 
Importantly, given the dominance of institu-
tional logics as an approach in recent years, it 
also provides another important lens into field 
change that includes actors and relations, 
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power structures and also the materiality of 
fields as embedded in governance and inter-
organizational and organizational structures. 
We argue that taking the approach of analyz-
ing the institutional infrastructure of fields 
provides a way to compare across fields, and 
impacts opportunities and pathways for insti-
tutional change that can sharpen our theoriz-
ing. We also argue that in comparing across 
fields that we are likely to find configurations 
of institutional infrastructural elements.
A further important area is the emergence 
and intersection of fields, including field over-
laps and interstitial spaces between fields. 
Once we go beyond the movement of logics 
from one field to another and pay attention 
to the infrastructure that both underpins those 
logics and also has a degree of independence 
from them, then we have a better handle on 
the emergence of fields. Our argument is that 
the emergence and subsequent institutionali-
zation of a field is as much about the develop-
ment and establishment of the infrastructural 
elements as it is about logics per se. And in 
those processes of developing, establishing 
and legitimizing new institutional infrastruc-
ture there is a very important area of research 
in examining the ways in which fields inter-
sect to allow the transporting and translating 
of infrastructural elements between fields.
Importantly, we have also suggested that 
the elements that make up institutional infra-
structure give us a valuable starting point for 
comparing fields and establishing whether 
there are a limited number of configurations 
of these elements. But we believe that the 
real utility of such an approach is to theorize 
field differences and, as a result, understand 
better their role in the institutional dynam-
ics of change. We have argued that different 
paths of field level change occur as a result 
of interactions, of logics in particular, with 
institutional infrastructure. Essentially there 
are different field level conditions, best 
apprehended through ideas of institutional 
infrastructure, that effect field-level change. 
An important research agenda is to system-
atically examine this proposition and identify 
a typology of infrastructural configurations 
and their effects on pathways of institutional 
change under different conditions.
Notes








 2 First Nations, or Canada’s aboriginal peoples, 
became allies with ENGOs because they were 
attempting to gain decision-making power and 
resource rights over the land they claimed as their 
traditional territories.
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